What is it to occupy a first-person stance? Is the first-personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? The Self recommends a new way to approach those questions, finding inspiration in theories about consciousness and mind in first millennial India. These philosophers do not regard the first-person stance as in conflict with the natural — their idea of nature is not that of scientific naturalism, but rather a liberal naturalism non-exclusive of the normative.

Venue : Library Room, Department of Philosophy, Chengchi University

Jonardon Ganeri，英國Sussex大學哲學教授，曾在劍橋大學研讀數學與物理學，後於牛津大學獲得哲學博士學位。其研究領域涵括知識論、形上學、語言哲學與邏輯，主要研究自我、意識、自我知識、理性概念等主題，其取徑為連結印度哲學傳統與當代英美分析哲學。本次來台將討論其最新著作 The Self : Naturalism, Consciousness and the First-Person Stance (Oxford University Press, 2012)，該書從印度哲學獲得啟發，主張第一人稱立場與某種自然主義是相容的。

主持人：林鎮國（政治大學哲學系）

16:20-17:00 Concluding Remarks

The existence or non-existence of persons was the cardinal issue in dispute within the rationalistic tradition of Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate. Historically, Xuánzàng’s 玄奘(602-664Treatise Proving Consciousness-Only (* Vijñaptimātrasiddhi-śāstra; Cheng weishi lun《成唯識論》) is of considerable importance because it contains crucial early materials documenting the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate up to the 7th century, an important period which is under-documented in the available Sanskrit sources. The only direct commentaries on the Cheng weishi lun by Xuanzang’s disciple, Kuījī 窺基(632-682 C.E.), are also of considerable historical interest in that they contain a wealth of material on the arguments of the Sāṅkhya (數論), Vaiśeṣika(衛世; 勝論; 吠世史迦) Jaina, and Śaiva (i.e., Paśupata 獸主and Parivrājaka 波利呾羅拘迦) interlocutors (pūrvapakṣins) represented in the Cheng weishi lun. Philosophically, Kuījī’s Recorded Explanations on the Treatise Proving Consciousness Only (Vijñaptimātra-siddhi-śāstra)《成唯識論述記》and Essentials of the Treatise Proving Consciousness-Only in the Palm of the Hand《成唯識論掌中樞要》are of particular interest in that his arguments against these views of Self are constructed in the form of formal inferences, composed of subject-locus (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta). In this paper, I investigate Kuiji’s exegesis on the first section of the Cheng weishi lun in order to clarify a number of puzzling passages dealing with the diverse doctrinal theories of the rival traditions.

The existence or non-existence of persons was the cardinal issue in dispute within the rationalistic tradition of Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate. Historically, Xuánzàng’s 玄奘(602-664Treatise Proving Consciousness-Only (* Vijñaptimātrasiddhi-śāstra; Cheng weishi lun《成唯識論》) is of considerable importance because it contains crucial early materials documenting the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate up to the 7th century, an important period which is under-documented in the available Sanskrit sources. The only direct commentaries on the Cheng weishi lun by Xuanzang’s disciple, Kuījī 窺基(632-682 C.E.), are also of considerable historical interest in that they contain a wealth of material on the arguments of the Sāṅkhya (數論), Vaiśeṣika(衛世; 勝論; 吠世史迦) Jaina, and Śaiva (i.e., Paśupata 獸主and Parivrājaka 波利呾羅拘迦) interlocutors (pūrvapakṣins) represented in the Cheng weishi lun. Philosophically, Kuījī’s Recorded Explanations on the Treatise Proving Consciousness Only (Vijñaptimātra-siddhi-śāstra)《成唯識論述記》and Essentials of the Treatise Proving Consciousness-Only in the Palm of the Hand《成唯識論掌中樞要》are of particular interest in that his arguments against these views of Self are constructed in the form of formal inferences, composed of subject-locus (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta). In this paper, I investigate Kuiji’s exegesis on the first section of the Cheng weishi lun in order to clarify a number of puzzling passages dealing with the diverse doctrinal theories of the rival traditions.d